The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games
I survey the literature on network formation in situations where the possible gains from cooperation of coalitions of agents are modeled by a coalitional game. I discuss the models that appear in the literature and their predictions on the networks that will be formed according to various equilibrium concepts, as well as the eventual payoffs to the players in equilibrium networks.
|Date of creation:||08 Jan 2004|
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