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A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games

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  • Julio Gonzalez-Diaz
  • Miguel Melendez-Jimenez

Abstract

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio Gonzalez-Diaz & Miguel Melendez-Jimenez, 2007. "A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 1446, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1446
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    non-cooperative game theory; equilibrium concepts; perfect bayesian; Bayes rule.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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