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Do Physicians Follow the Golden Rule? Evidence of Imperfect Agency and Moral Hazard from Physicians’ Self-Prescriptions

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Listed:
  • Mariana Carrera
  • Niels Skipper

Abstract

Using data on prescriptions for cholesterol-lowering drugs (statins), we study differences in the treatments chosen by Danish physicians for themselves versus for their patients. We estimate that physicians discount patient health benefit relative to their own, valuing the additional potency of a stronger statin by significantly more if it is for their own use. We exploit variation in expected coinsurance to estimate that moral hazard accounts for a modest share, no more than 15%, of this additional valuation. Statin-using physicians also respond more quickly to a patent expiration, suggesting greater effort to stay informed on drug classes they personally use.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariana Carrera & Niels Skipper, 2025. "Do Physicians Follow the Golden Rule? Evidence of Imperfect Agency and Moral Hazard from Physicians’ Self-Prescriptions," NBER Working Papers 33954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33954
    Note: EH
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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