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Capital Structure & Firm Outcomes: Evidence from Dividend Recapitalizations in Private Equity

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Listed:
  • Abhishek Bhardwaj
  • Abhinav Gupta
  • Sabrina T. Howell

Abstract

We study the effect of a large increase in firm leverage. We isolate the independent, causal effect of debt using the setting of private equity-sponsored dividend recapitalizations, where companies take on debt to pay investor returns, and opportunistic responsiveness to credit supply permits a causal design. After accounting for positive selection, higher total debt (84% on average) dramatically increases the chance of financial distress (by 2.4 times the targeted firm mean), in line with Altman-Z calibrations. Dividend recapitalizations increase deal returns but reduce fund returns, possibly reflecting moral hazard. They also reduce employee wages and loan prices for pre-existing creditors.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhishek Bhardwaj & Abhinav Gupta & Sabrina T. Howell, 2025. "Capital Structure & Firm Outcomes: Evidence from Dividend Recapitalizations in Private Equity," NBER Working Papers 33435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33435
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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