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Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?

Author

Listed:
  • Gustavo J. Bobonis
  • Paul Gertler
  • Marco Gonzalez-Navarro
  • Simeon Nichter

Abstract

Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians’ provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens’ demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens’ willingness to supply clientelist votes. Results also offer novel insights into audits’ dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2023. "Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?," NBER Working Papers 31266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31266
    Note: DEV LE POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Britto, Diogo & Daniele, Gianmarco & Le Moglie, Marco & Pinotti, Paolo & Sampaio, Breno, 2024. "A Few Bad Apples? Criminal Charges, Political Careers, and Policy Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 17328, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Xun, Yang, 2024. "Corruption and Talent Allocation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1526, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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