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Tax Evasion, Efficiency, and Bunching in the Presence of Enforcement Notches

Author

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  • Daniel M. Hungerman

Abstract

A recent literature has studied bunching at notches in tax systems; but work on the implications of bunching for welfare has been limited. We consider a setting where there are discrete changes in the enforcement of tax compliance at certain levels of reported income, creating notches that can lead to bunching. We find that greater levels of bunching can be associated with greater tax efficiency. A simulation exercise demonstrates that notches with greater bunching can be associated with higher welfare than notches with less bunching, and that a tax system with bunching at a notch can generate higher overall social welfare than a revenue-equivalent no-evasion linear tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel M. Hungerman, 2021. "Tax Evasion, Efficiency, and Bunching in the Presence of Enforcement Notches," NBER Working Papers 28826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28826
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    Cited by:

    1. Agneša Víghová, 2022. "Detection of tax evasion using tax audits in the Slovak Republic," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 10(1), pages 214-225, September.
    2. Bíró, Anikó & Prinz, Dániel & Sándor, László, 2022. "The minimum wage, informal pay, and tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    3. Michele Bernasconi & Irene Maria Buso & Anna Marenzi & Dino Rizzi, 2025. "Tax Notches in the Lab: Disentangling Real and Evasion Responses," Working Papers 2025: 15, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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