Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation : une application au keiretsu financier japonais
This paper focuses on the mechanisms of collective control, such as in Japanese keiretsu, that is characterized by firms’ groupings, decentralized decision-makings and cross-shareholdings. We develop a model about these mechanisms based on initial incentive contracts offered by shareholders to the manager, with an asymmetric information and with a possibility of compensation payments. These mechanisms of control are compared to reputation control, the latter working on original discount process. The results are obtained with simulations. The efficiency of the collective control depends on the levels of discount coefficient and on the differences in effort costs and expected profits. The collective control tends to dominate for a larger number of environment states for which reputation is inefficient to maintain discipline over the manager only. On the other hand, the reputation appears to be especially for high discounting coefficients, low learning costs or periods, and for high values of accumulated reputation.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 01 44 07 81 00
Fax: 01 44 07 81 09
Web page: http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/Email:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla05046. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.