IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/wpsorb/bla05046.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation : une application au keiretsu financier japonais

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Soulat

    () (TEAM)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the mechanisms of collective control, such as in Japanese keiretsu, that is characterized by firms’ groupings, decentralized decision-makings and cross-shareholdings. We develop a model about these mechanisms based on initial incentive contracts offered by shareholders to the manager, with an asymmetric information and with a possibility of compensation payments. These mechanisms of control are compared to reputation control, the latter working on original discount process. The results are obtained with simulations. The efficiency of the collective control depends on the levels of discount coefficient and on the differences in effort costs and expected profits. The collective control tends to dominate for a larger number of environment states for which reputation is inefficient to maintain discipline over the manager only. On the other hand, the reputation appears to be especially for high discounting coefficients, low learning costs or periods, and for high values of accumulated reputation.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Soulat, 2005. "Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation : une application au keiretsu financier japonais," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla05046, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla05046
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2005/Bla05046.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive theory; corporate governance; reputation and control mechanisms; Japanese keiretsu.;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla05046. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/msep1fr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.