IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/wpsorb/94007.html

Macroeconomic performance and wage setting level in symmetric non-cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Cahuc

    (MAD - Université Paris 1)

Abstract

This paper shows that the relationship between the wage and the wage setting level is necessarily monotonic in symmetric non cooperative games between monopoly Trade Unions, when the conditions of stability of Nash equilibria are taken into account. Moreover, the Trade Unions' welfare raises with the degree of centralisation

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc, 1994. "Macroeconomic performance and wage setting level in symmetric non-cooperative games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 94007, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:94007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04697150
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:94007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Label (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/msep1fr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.