How can gender discrimination explain fertility behaviors and family-friendly policies ?
This paper focuses on the interaction between gender discrimination and household decisions. It develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, endogenous labor supply and endogenous size of government spending. Family policies are assumed to decrease the time that parents spend on their children. The model shows that gender discrimination may explain differences in household decisions between countries. The solution shows a U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. An increase in the discrimination level implies a related decrease in fertility, women's participation in the labor force and in family-friendly policies.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2008|
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