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Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System

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  • Cheikbossian, G.

Abstract

We analyze a centralized system as one in which a political authority finances by general taxation two local public goods each one associated with a particular region. Because individuals in the two regions have different preferences, they engage in rent-seeking activities to influence centralized policy-making in their preferred direction. Several results emerge from the analysis and in particular rent-seeking is shown to be increasing in taste heterogeneity and in the degree of spillovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  • Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2004.12
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    File URL: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier120304.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Feng Xie & David Levinson, 2009. "Governance choice on a serial network," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 189-212, October.
    2. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 133-150, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    (LOCAL) PUBLIC GOODS ; RENT-SEEKING ; GENERAL TAXATION ; SPILLOVERS;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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