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Stockage de gaz et Modulation : une analyse stratégique

Author

Listed:
  • Baranes, E.
  • Mirabel, F.
  • Poudou, J.-C.

Abstract

Cet article s’intéresse au rôle stratégique de l’activité de stockage du gaz et de sa régulation lorsqu’il existe un marché spot de la ressource. Dans la lignée de la littérature sur ce thème, nous envisageons l’activité de stockage comme un instrument de flexibilité pour les approvisionnements en gaz d’un opérateur qui sert la demande en période de pointe. Dans ce cas, un arbitrage est fait entre l’utilisation du stockage et le recours à un marché de court terme pour servir la demande. L’originalité de notre modèle réside dans le lien établi entre les volumes de gaz stockés et le prix sur le marché spot : dans certains cas, le gaz stocké permet de fournir une partie de la demande et contribue ainsi à faire baisser le prix sur le marché de court terme. On montre qu’il est parfois optimal pour le régulateur de permettre le sur-stockage, notamment lorsque le nombre d’arbitragistes sur le marché spot est insuffisant (marché peu fluide).

Suggested Citation

  • Baranes, E. & Mirabel, F. & Poudou, J.-C., 2004. "Stockage de gaz et Modulation : une analyse stratégique," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 04.07.48, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  • Handle: RePEc:mop:credwp:04.07.48
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    File URL: http://www.creden.univ-montp1.fr/downloads/cahiers/CC-04-07-48.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carine Swartenbroekx, 2007. "The gas chain : influence of its specificities on the liberalisation process," Working Paper Document 122, National Bank of Belgium.
    2. Girault Vincent, 2005. "Structure de la concurrence sur la chaîne du gaz naturel : le marché européen," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 05.01.55, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    3. Girault Vincent, 2005. "L’approvisionnement gazier sur un marche oligopolistique : une analyse par la théorie économique," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 05.04.56, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    STOCKAGE; MARCHE SPOT; MARCHE GAZIER;

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General

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