Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions
In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2010|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.recent.unimore.it/|
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