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Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions

Author

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  • Ennio Bilancini

    ()

  • Leonardo Boncinelli

    ()

Abstract

In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result.

Suggested Citation

  • Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2010. "Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 045, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  • Handle: RePEc:mod:recent:045
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    Keywords

    atomless; single crossing; strict Nash; pure Nash; monotone Nash;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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