IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

'Necessary Costs' and the Incentive of the English Rule

Listed author(s):
  • Hyde, C.E.
  • Williams, P.L.
Registered author(s):

    The English rule of court cost allocation only allows costs that are deemed to be 'necessary' or 'proper' for the attainment of justice to be shifted from the winner to the loser at trial. We model litigants who optimize with respect to the level of legal inuts they use, and compare the incentive effects of such a rule against the standard representation of the English rule, wherein all costs are assumed to be transferred from the winner to the loser. We show that the incentive to file suit, to settle before going to trial, and to spend resources on litigation if settlement is not reached can be higher or lower for risk neutral litigants than is predicted by the stylized English rule. Lastely, we show that litigation expenditure is affected by the degree of uncertainty (risk-neutral) litigants face regarding the level of necessary costs. Thus, under the English rule, courts affect litigants' incentives through the precision with which they define necessary costs.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 643.

    in new window

    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: 1998
    Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:643
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia

    Phone: +61 3 8344 8560
    Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:643. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Muntasha Meemnun Khan)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.