Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspetive
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Monica Das Gupta, 1999.
"Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite: Exploring the role of governance in fertility decline,"
Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(5), pages 1-25.
- Das Gupta, Monica, 1999. "Liberte, egalite, fraternite : exploring the role of governance in fertility decline," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2126, The World Bank.
- Campos, Nauro & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 2000.
"Investment and Instability,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2609, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nauro F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2001. "Investment and Instability," Development and Comp Systems 0012015, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nauros F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2000. "Investment and Instability," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 337, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Ani Guerdjikova & Levon Barseghyan, 2008. "Private Incentives versus Class Interests: A Theory of Optimal Institutions with An Application to Growth," 2008 Meeting Papers 939, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 2001.
"The Politics of Co-optation,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 591-607, December.
- Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1999. "The Politics of Cooptation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2156, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywords
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ; ECONOMIC GROWTH ; DISTRIBUTION;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:96-32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Linda Woodbury (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edmitus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.