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Communication and performance in Bank-Fund joint participation

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  • Silvia, Marchesi

Abstract

In this paper I relate Bank-Fund's performance to their willingness (or ability) to communicate. I find evidence that a Bank-Fund simultaneous loan is associated to an increase in economic growth and that such effect is diminished by factors preventing full communication, such as the degree of Bank-Fund competition and the salience of asymmetric information. Politically motivated loans seem -at least to some extent- stimulate more IMF-WB interaction which turns out to be associated to higher economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia, Marchesi, 2015. "Communication and performance in Bank-Fund joint participation," Working Papers 319, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 28 Dec 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:319
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2011. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 86-98, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF and WB conditionality; coordination; communication;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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