Good Policy Choices Even When Voters Entertain Biased Beliefs: A Model with Endogenous Valence
In “The Myth of the Rational Voter” Brian Caplan shows that voters entertain systematically biased beliefs on a number of essential issues of economic policy and concludes that this leads democracies to choose bad policies. We introduce the psychological concept of mental models to address voters’ naive reasoning about the economy and thereby explain the persistent bias in beliefs. Next, we develop a game-theoretical model to show that this does not automatically lead to bad policy choices. The model formalizes Caplan’s thought experiment No. 4 by introducing endogenous party valence to a model of probabilistic voting. In so doing, we provide an investigation of when good policies are chosen in democracy. Based on our findings, we discuss the impact of different political institutions on economic outcomes.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg|
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200824. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.