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The Bureaucracy Trap

Author

Listed:
  • Ascensión Andina-Díaz

    (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga.)

  • Francesco Feri

    (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London.)

  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez

    (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga.)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Andina-D´?az et al. (2021) show that in a context of dynamic elections, rigid institutions induce political parties to push policies as far as the political system allows, whereas more flexible institutions can foster moderate alternation. We build on this paper to study the incentive of an elected government to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and increase institutional flexibility. We show that high levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies are very likely to persist over time, leading to a bureaucracy trap. Moreover, we find that regardless of the initial levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies, traditional long-life parties may have no incentive to undertake such a reform. This result provides a new argument to explain why bureaucratic inefficiencies persist in some countries over time

Suggested Citation

  • Ascensión Andina-Díaz & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2022. "The Bureaucracy Trap," Working Papers 2022-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2022-3
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    File URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2022-3.pdf
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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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