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Stochastic Deadlines: A Comparison of Parallel Multiple Auction Designs

Author

Listed:
  • Sascha Füllbrunn

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

  • Tim Hoppe

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

In online auction platforms, offers are listed side by side and may end at the same point in time. While theoretical studies predict efficient coordination across auctions, experimental and empirical studies observe efficiency losses, i.e. goods remain unsold. In order to mitigate this coordination failure, we contribute to the literature of auction design by introducing a stochastic deadline in parallel multiple auctions. In these parallel Candle Auctions, several auctions start at the same time but end (separately) due to a stochastic process. We think that the stochastic ending rule decreases the coordination failure because the threat of a sudden termination forces the bidders to coordinate across auctions early in the auction process. Indeed, we find that coordination is less pronounced in parallel Candle Auctions resulting in higher efficiency

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Füllbrunn & Tim Hoppe, 2009. "Stochastic Deadlines: A Comparison of Parallel Multiple Auction Designs," FEMM Working Papers 09015, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:09015
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    File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2009_Dateien/2009_15.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simultaneous Auctions; Internet; Auction Design; Experimental Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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