Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identifying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments
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- Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2013.
"Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 853-870, August.
- Sebastian Kube & Michel Andrï¿½ Marï¿½chal & Clemens Puppe, 2010. "Do wage cuts damage work morale? Evidence from a natural field experiment," IEW - Working Papers 471, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2011.
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KeywordsEconometrics of contracts; Incentives; Experiments;
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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