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Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (II)

Author

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  • Benteng Zou

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract

One family of heterogeneous strategies in differential games with (a)symmetric players is developed in which one player adopts an anticipating open-loop strategy and the other adopts a standard Markovian strategy. Via conjecturing principle, the anticipating open-loop strategic player plans his strategy based on the possi- ble updating the rival player may take. These asymmetric strategies frame non- degenerate Markovian Nash Equilibrium, which can be subgame perfect. Except the stationary path, this kind of strategy makes the study of short-run trajectory possible, which usually are not subgame perfect. However, the short-run non- perfection provides very important policy suggestions.

Suggested Citation

  • Benteng Zou, 2014. "Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (II)," DEM Discussion Paper Series 14-14, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-14
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10993/19676
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    Cited by:

    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2022. "Optimal coalition splitting with heterogenous strategies," Working Papers halshs-03770401, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential Games; subgame perfect Markovian Nash Equilibrium; Heterogeneous strategy; anticipating open-loop strategy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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