Obfuscation, Inequality and Votes: A Model of Policy Choice under Rent Seeking
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KeywordsRent seeking; Optimal obfuscation; Inequality; Chile; Malaysia;
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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