Tax-Benefit Linkages in Pension Systems (a note)
This note shows that a public pension system with a fairly general individual tax-benefit linkage is (computationally) equivalent to a system without linkages. The "equivalent" pension system without linkages does not only facilitate simulations of policy experiments, but also offers some insight into the implied tax structure of the tax-benefit linkage.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2000|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol.4 (3), July 2002, pp. 405-415|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne|
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.20
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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