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Controlled-by-owner Firms, Mobility of Capital and Microeconomic Profit Rate Maximization

Listed author(s):
  • MESNARD, Louis de


    (LATEC - CNRS - Université de Bourgogne)

When they actively control the firm, owners select the firm that has the best profit rate if the hypothesis of mobility of capital is adopted: controlled-by-owner firms are profit-rate-maximizing when sleeping-owner firms are pure-profit-maximizing. Both types are compared in monopoly, in perfect competition, in classical or in mixed duopoly. Always, controlled-by-owner firms have a lower output than comparable sleeping-owner firms. It only takes a fixed coefficient of equity capital to do that price plays no role for controlled-by-owner firms in perfect competition; in duopoly, it only takes a similar condition plus a linear demand to do that reaction functions vanish. and supply driven models) and the effect of an exogenous factor (final demand or added-value). The note recalls that another method is possible, the comparison of the stability of technical and allocation coefficients, generalized by the biproportional filter: if for a sector, after biproportional filtering, column coefficients are more stable than row coefficients, then this sector is declared as not supply-driven (but one cannot decide that it is demand-driven anyway), and conversely...

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Paper provided by LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne in its series LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) with number 9901.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:1999-01
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