IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lam/wpaper/10-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Real Options under Choquet-Brownian Ambiguitys

Author

Listed:
  • David Roubaud
  • André Lapied
  • Robert Kast

Abstract

Real options models characterized by the presence of “ambiguity” (or “Knightian uncertainty”) have been recently proposed. But based on recursive multiple-priors preferences, they typically describe ambiguity through a range of Geometric Brownian motions and solve it by application of a maxmin expected utility criterion among them (worst case). This reduces acceptable individual preferences to the single case of an extreme form of pessimism. In contrast, by relying on dynamically consistent “Choquet-Brownian” motions to represent the ambiguous cash flows expected from a project, we show that a much broader spectrum of attitudes towards ambiguity may be accounted for, improving the explanatory and application potentials of these appealing expanded real options models. In the case of a perpetual real option to invest, ambiguity aversion may delay the moment of exercise of the option, while the opposite holds true for an ambiguity seeking decision maker. Furthermore, an intricate relationship between risk and ambiguity appears strikingly in our model.

Suggested Citation

  • David Roubaud & André Lapied & Robert Kast, 2010. "Real Options under Choquet-Brownian Ambiguitys," Working Papers 10-20, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:10-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2010-20.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward Christie & Mario Holzner, 2006. "What Explains Tax Evasion? An Empirical Assessment based on European Data," wiiw Working Papers 40, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.
    2. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December.
    3. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines, vol. 18(1), pages 27-56, June.
    4. Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1998. "Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-73, October.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Pickhardt, Michael, 2006. "Fifty Years after Samuelson's “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”: What are we Left With?," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(04), pages 439-460, December.
    7. Richard Cornes, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-271.
    8. James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 893-902, June.
    9. Becker, Winfried & Buchner, Heinz-Jurgen & Sleeking, Simon, 1987. "The impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion : An experimental approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 243-252, November.
    10. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    11. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    12. James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312.
    13. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    14. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
    15. Michael Pickhardt, 2005. "Teaching Public Goods Theory With a Classroom Game," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(2), pages 145-159, April.
    16. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 818-860.
    17. Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
    18. Parkash Chander & Louis L. Wilde, 1998. "A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 165-183.
    19. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    20. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
    21. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 455-483.
    22. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May.
    23. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 657-683, December.
    24. Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles W. & Slemrod, Joel, 2001. "Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 1), pages 125-38, March.
    25. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    26. Michael Pickhardt & Jordi Sarda Pons, 2006. "Size and scope of the underground economy in Germany," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(14), pages 1707-1713.
    27. James M. Walker & Matthew A. Halloran, 2004. "Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(3), pages 235-247, October.
    28. Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles W. & Slemrod, Joel, 2001. "Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(1), pages 125-138, March.
    29. Michael Pickhardt, 2005. "Some remarks on self-interest, the historical schools and the evolution of the theory of public goods," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 275-293, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kast, Robert & Lapied, André & Roubaud, David, 2014. "Modelling under ambiguity with dynamically consistent Choquet random walks and Choquet–Brownian motions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 495-503.
    2. repec:wsi:ijtafx:v:20:y:2017:i:07:n:s0219024917500443 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. So, Leh-chyan, 2013. "Are Real Options “Real”? Isolating Uncertainty from Risk in Real Options Analysis," MPRA Paper 52493, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00281 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. David Roubaud & Alain Lapied & Robert Kast, 2017. "Modelling under ambiguity with two correlated Choquet-Brownian motions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, pages 1012-1020.
    6. Flor, Christian Riis & Hesel, Søren, 2015. "Uncertain dynamics, correlation effects, and robust investment decisions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 278-298.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:10-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/lamplfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.