On the (In-)Efficiency of Unanimity in Multilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Recognition
In this paper, we study the (symmetric) equilibria of a model of multilateral bar- gaining where players are heterogeneous regarding their time preferences, and make costly efforts at the beginning of the process in order to inuence their probabilities of being the proposer for all stages of the negotiation process. We analyse whether the optimality of the unanimity rule (as the voting rule minimizing the social cost resulting from the agents' willingness to buy inuence) characterised in Yildirim (2007) extends to the present situation. In the case of weakly heterogeneous agents, we show that k-majority rules may actually become strictly optimal. Then we provide numerical ex- amples that suggest that there are situations where each type of voting rule (unanimity and strict k-majority) may be socially optimal.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:||Oct 2010|
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- Nicolas Quérou & Raphael Soubeyran, 2011. "Voting Rules in Bargaining with Costly Persistent Recognition," Working Papers 11-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
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