Pollution Tax and Social Welfare in Oligopoly: Asymmetric Taxation on Identical Polluters
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- Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2015.
"Tax Uniformity: A Commitment Device for Restraining Opportunistic Behavior,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(5), pages 641-672, October.
- Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2008. "Tax uniformity: A commitment device for restraining opportunistic behaviour," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1971108.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
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KeywordsCournot Duopoly; Firm Asymmetry; Pollution Tax; Environmental Policy;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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