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Regulated Competition under Increasing Returns to Scale


  • Thomas Greve

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Hans Keiding

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)


This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of firms in the context of asymmetric information with the aim to induce firms to report its private information truthfully and to save information rents. Baron and Myerson (1982) have considered this problem and derived an optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. They show that it was possible to create a regulatory mechanism that induced the firm to report its private information truthfully. To secure this, a part of the mechanism is to pay the firm a subsidy. This article presents a regulatory mechanism which explores competition in the context of an industry characterized by increasing returns to scale. In contrast to the model in this article, the Baron and Myerson model doesn’t consider increasing returns to scale. In equilibrium each firm chooses to report truthfully without receiving any subsidy. However, the use of competition gives rise to an efficiency lost.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Greve & Hans Keiding, 2010. "Regulated Competition under Increasing Returns to Scale," Discussion Papers 11-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1101

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Clark, Gregory, 1994. "Factory Discipline," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(01), pages 128-163, March.
    2. Henriksen, Ingrid & Hviid, Morten, 2005. "Diffusion of new technology and complementary best practice: A case study," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(03), pages 365-397, December.
    3. Bailey, DeeVon & Biswas, Basudeb & Kumbhakar, Subal C. & Schulthies, B. Kris, 1989. "An Analysis Of Technical, Allocative, And Scale Inefficiency: The Case Of Ecuadorian Dairy Farms," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 14(01), July.
    4. KevinH. O'Rourke, 2007. "Culture, Conflict and Cooperation: Irish Dairying Before the Great War," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1357-1379, October.
    5. Alvarez, Antonio & Arias, Carlos, 2004. "Technical efficiency and farm size: a conditional analysis," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 241-250, May.
    6. Williamson, Oliver E., 1980. "The organization of work a comparative institutional assessment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-38, March.
    7. Hallam, David & Machado, Fernando, 1996. "Efficiency Analysis with Panel Data: A Study of Portuguese Dairy Farms," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 79-93.
    8. Fan, Yanqin & Li, Qi & Weersink, Alfons, 1996. "Semiparametric Estimation of Stochastic Production Frontier Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 14(4), pages 460-468, October.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets


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