Is Economic Analysis of Any Help in Studies of Legitimacy in the EU?
The transaction cost approach in economics has been applied in theorizing how Europe is governed. In providing a functionalist explanation of political organization, it encourages beliefs that reforms improving organizational efficiency also increase the legitimacy of European leadership. This paper discusses institutional perspectives on how democratic legitimacy is built by those, who aspire to rule the EU. An economist’s view will be discussed against a background of models of legitimacy by Scharpf and Schmitter. In addition, a governance practice directed to diffusion policy is fenced off and a future empirical study is outlined.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2004|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2004|
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