Political involvement in the operation of an enterprises, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising form the interest groups´lobby activities disables the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other word, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), June 2000, 559-581|
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