IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuieci/1998-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Adverse Effects of Environmental Policy in Green Markets

Author

Listed:
  • J. L. Moraga-González

    (Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam)

  • Noemi Padrón-Fumero

    (University Pompeu Fabra)

Abstract

We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms or consumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for less polluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reduction policies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show that duopolists´ strategic behaviour may increase pollution levels. Maximum emission standards, commonly used in green markets, improve the environmental features of products. Nonetheless, overall pollution levels will rise because government regulation also affects market shares and boosts firms´ sales. Consequently, social welfare may be reduced. We also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges, including differentiation of charges.

Suggested Citation

  • J. L. Moraga-González & Noemi Padrón-Fumero, 1998. "The Adverse Effects of Environmental Policy in Green Markets," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_1997-1999/1998-11.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Valentini, Laura, 2005. "Environmental quality provision and eco-labelling: Some issues," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2005-02, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    2. Laura Valentini, 2005. "Environmental Quality Provision and Eco-labelling: Some Issues," Working Papers id:281, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    emission standards; subsidies; product charges; vertically differentiated duopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ciekudk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.