Commitments and Contests: a Game-Theoretic Perspective on Japanese Vertical Relationships
Various arrangements in vertical relationships have evolved in different countries to attain efficient trading relationships. Vertical relationships in Japan can be identified to have distinctive characteristics in several aspects compared with those in other countries. This study is a comprehensive understanding of Japanese vertical relationships based on the economic theory, particularly game theory and various empirical findings. Insights on the efficiency and governance mechanisms of the vertical relationships can be gained by investigating various arrangements of the vertical relationships from a game-theoretic perspective.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +81-(0)78 803 7036
Fax: +81-(0)78 803 7059
Web page: http://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Office of Promoting Research Collaboration, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.