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Strategyproof Voluntary Pairwise Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences

Author

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  • Ryo Tsukamoto

    (Department of Economics, Keio University)

Abstract

This study investigates pairwise endowment exchange without monetary transfers under dichotomous preferences, motivated by living donor kidney exchange problem. In contrast to the standard strict preference domain—where no mechanism satisfies efficiency, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality simultaneously—these properties are jointly achievable in this setting. We adopt a definition of mechanisms as welfare-based correspondences rather than single-valued functions, treating welfare-equivalent outcomes as identical. We provide the first characterization of mechanisms satisfying these properties and show that all mechanisms in this class closely resemble the priority mechanism (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2005), supporting its use in pairwise kidney exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Tsukamoto, 2026. "Strategyproof Voluntary Pairwise Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series DP2026-022, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    • Handle: RePEc:keo:dpaper:dp2026-022
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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