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On the Learning and Stability of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Strategic Substitutes

Author

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  • Eric Hoffmann

    (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic substi- tutes (GSS), complementing recent work done in the case of strategic complements (GSC). Mixed strategies in GSS are of particular interest because it is well known that such games need not exhibit pure strategy Nash equilibria. First, we establish bounds on the strategy space which indicate where randomizing behavior may occur in equilibrium. Second, we show that mixed strategy Nash equilibria are generally unstable under a wide variety of learning rules. Multiple examples are given.y.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Hoffmann, 2014. "On the Learning and Stability of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Strategic Substitutes," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201405, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kan:wpaper:201405
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    File URL: http://www2.ku.edu/~kuwpaper/2014Papers/201305.pdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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