Elimination Of Arbitrage States In Asymmetric Information Models
In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially ¡°arbitrage state(s)¡±, namely, the state(s) which would grant the agent an arbitrage, if realizable.
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|Date of revision:||Feb 2005|
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