IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Institution Transfers, The Marshall Plan, Europe, and Ukraine: An Analytical Narrative


  • Atin Basuchoudhary

    (Virginia Military Institute)

  • Andreas Freytag

    (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena; and University of Stellenbosch, and CESifo Research Network, and STIAS)

  • Troy Siemers

    (Virginia Military Institute)


This paper offers an analytical narrative based on an assurance game with two separate populations in an evolutionary setting. In our model, Donors and Recipients are two populations; let us call them Europe and Ukraine. The donor population has two types. A proportion of this population wants to promote a Marshall Plan-type model for the recipient state, and another prefers isolationism. A proportion of the population of the recipient state also intends to coordinate a Marshall Plan-type economic integration. In contrast, others prefer foreign aid but view further integration as a violation of sovereignty (or, with Ukraine, may be afraid of further Russian attacks from this integration). Marshall plan type coordination provides the highest payoffs through, e.g., the peace dividend, better institutions in Ukraine, widened European integration trade links, or global financial integration. Coordination is costly because it requires substantial institutional change on both sides. We use simulations to track outcomes given that European support for Ukraine and Ukrainian desire for aid may be endogenous. Further, we show how these endogenous outcomes respond to political shocks in Europe that affect European support for Ukraine and implicitly the lack of support for Ukraine.

Suggested Citation

  • Atin Basuchoudhary & Andreas Freytag & Troy Siemers, 2023. "Institution Transfers, The Marshall Plan, Europe, and Ukraine: An Analytical Narrative," Jena Economics Research Papers 2023-017, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2023-017

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Institutional Transfer; Institutional Coordination; Evolutionary Game Theory; Ukraine War; Foreign Aid;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P41 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2023-017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Markus Pasche (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.