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Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

  • Hannah Hörisch

    (University of Munich)

  • Oliver Kirchkamp

    ()

    (University of Jena, School of Economics)

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2008-023.

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Date of creation: 18 Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-023
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  1. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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