Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions
We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.
|Date of creation:||18 Mar 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +049 3641/ 9 43000
Fax: +049 3641/ 9 43000
Web page: http://www.jenecon.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999.
"The Generalized War of Attrition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, EconWPA.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
- Roth, David, 1996. "Rationalizable Predatory Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 380-396, February.
- Vogt, Carsten & Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2002. " Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 67-78, January.
- Amemiya, Takeshi, 1984. "Tobit models: A survey," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 3-61.
- Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
- Yasar Barut & Dan Kovenock & Charles Noussair, 1999.
"A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 99-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Yasar Barut & Dan Kovenock & Charles N. Noussair, 2002. "A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 675-708, August.
- Marc Bilodeau & Al Slivinski, .
"Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a Public service,"
- Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 299-308, February.
- Bilodeau, M. & Slivinsky, A., 1994. "Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a public service," Cahiers de recherche 94-01, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
- Müller, W. & Schotter, A., 2003.
"Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations,"
2003-43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Wieland Muller & Andrew Schotter, 2007. "Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations," Working Papers 0022, New York University, Center for Experimental Social Science.
- Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991.
"Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,"
6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1996. "The Timing and Incidence of Exploratory Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 388-407, June.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
- James Tobin, 1956. "Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Amemiya, Takeshi, 1973. "Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable is Truncated Normal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 997-1016, November.
- Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Pasche)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.