Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience
It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sectorâ€™s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in IDE Discussion Paper. No. 58. 2006.6|
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