Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms'payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profiteffects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicatethat vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No. 221. 2010-01-01|
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