IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jau/wpaper/2012-13.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Identifying stakeholders through a multilevel analysis: Securing support for eye-health policy in low and middle income countries

Author

Listed:
  • Eva Camacho-Cuena

    () (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I)

  • Piergiuseppe Morone

    () (University of Foggia, Italy)

  • Nicholas Banatvala

    () (Prevention of Blindness and Deafness World Health Organization)

  • Ivo Kocur

    () (Prevention of Blindness and Deafness World Health Organization)

Abstract

Blindness and visual impairment is considered a public health problem in a vast majority of low- and middle-income countries. This paper empirically evaluates advocacy in low and middle income countries as the key tool to raising policy priority and securing high-level decision maker support in eye health. We use a dataset based on a survey conducted by WHO in 2011 among the Ministries of Health in order to collect information on policy and decision making in the area of eye care and prevention of blindness and includes the information on 82 low and middle income countries. The theoretical framework used in our analysis is based on the idea that pressure upon national government is exerted by a plethora of stakeholders both at local and global level, acting on the economic and the political context. Combining these two levels and contexts of stakeholders' action we build a 2X2 pressure matrix in order to assess the involvement of economic and political institutions in advocacy activities. Our empirical analysis identifies the existence of structural differences across countries with different income levels regarding the stakeholders' involvement and proposes a set of policy recommendations in order to secure high-level decision makers support and commitment to promoting eye-health.

Suggested Citation

  • Eva Camacho-Cuena & Piergiuseppe Morone & Nicholas Banatvala & Ivo Kocur, 2012. "Identifying stakeholders through a multilevel analysis: Securing support for eye-health policy in low and middle income countries," Working Papers 2012/13, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  • Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.doctreballeco.uji.es/wpficheros/camacho_etal_2012.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pommerehne, Werner W & Schneider, Friedrich & Zweifel, Peter, 1982. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: A Reexamination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 569-574, June.
    2. Andrea Morone & Ozlem Ozdemir, 2012. "Displaying Uncertain Information About Probability: Experimental Evidence," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 157-171, April.
    3. Seidl, Christian, 2002. " Preference Reversal," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 621-655, December.
    4. Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe, 2012. "Are small groups expected utility?," MPRA Paper 38198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. John Hey & Andrea Morone & Ulrich Schmidt, 2009. "Noise and bias in eliciting preferences," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 213-235, December.
    6. Morone, Andrea, 2010. "On price data elicitation: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 540-545, October.
    7. Drehmann, Mathias & Oechssler, Jorg & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Herding with and without payoff externalities -- an internet experiment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 391-415, April.
    8. Carmela Di Mauro & Anna Maffioletti, 2004. "Attitudes to risk and attitudes to uncertainty: experimental evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(4), pages 357-372.
    9. Andrea Morone & Ulrich Schmidt, 2008. "An Experimental Investigation of Alternatives to Expected Utility Using Pricing Data," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, pages 1-12.
    10. Andrea Morone, 2008. "Comparison of Mean-Variance Theory and Expected-Utility Theory through a Laboratory Experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(40), pages 1-7.
    11. Muller, Alfred, 1998. "Comparing risks with unbounded distributions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 229-239, September.
    12. William T. Harbaugh & Kate Krause & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "Prospect Theory in Choice and Pricing Tasks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-02, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2007.
    13. Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Seidl, Christian & Morone, Andrea, 2005. "Comparing preference reversal for general lotteries and income distributions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 682-710, October.
    14. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 623-638, September.
    15. Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 971-978, September.
    16. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Segal, Uzi, 1988. "Does the Preference Reversal Phenomenon Necessarily Contradict the Independence Axiom?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 233-236, March.
    18. Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, 1989. "Decision processes for low probability events: Policy implications," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 565-592.
    19. Meroz, Yael & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe, 2009. "Eliciting environmental preferences of Ghanaians in the laboratory: An incentive-compatible experiment," MPRA Paper 17107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Viscusi, W Kip & Evans, William N, 1990. "Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 353-374, June.
    21. Seidl, Christian & Traub, Stefan & Morone, Andrea, 2003. "Relative Deprivation, Personal Income Satisfaction, and Average Well-Being under Different Income Distributions," Economics Working Papers 2003-05, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    22. John Hey & Jinkwon Lee, 2005. "Do Subjects Separate (or Are They Sophisticated)?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(3), pages 233-265, September.
    23. Ganderton, Philip T. & Brookshire, David S. & McKee, Michael & Stewart, Steve & Thurston, Hale, 2000. "Buying Insurance for Disaster-Type Risks: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 271-289, May.
    24. Machina, Mark J & Pratt, John W, 1997. "Increasing Risk: Some Direct Constructions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 103-127, March.
    25. Susan K. Laury, 2006. "Pay One or Pay All: Random Selection of One Choice for Payment," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-24, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    26. Holt, Charles A, 1986. "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 508-515, June.
    27. Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2004. "Is Probability Weighting Sensitive to the Magnitude of Consequences? An Experimental Investigation on Losses," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 217-235, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stakeholder analysis; pressure matrix; health policy;

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (María Aurora Garcia Gallego). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ueujies.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.