Strategic investments and multinational firms under oligopoly
We have developed a simple oligopoly model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions are determined in an endogenous fashion. There is a host oligopoly facing competition from a foreign oligopoly in the form of either foreign investment or exports. Then, we propose a multi-stage game to stress the role played by the interactions among foreign rival firms´ decisions, and we identify some of the determinants of a switch from an exporting strategy to an FDI strategy. A delay in the investment is more likely found for big enough country-specific fixed costs and low values of the oligopoly profitability. Our model provides a theoretical basis which leads to predictions in line with previous empirical studies.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1997|
|Publication status:||Published by Ivie|
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