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Corresponsabilización fiscal de dos niveles de gobierno: relaciones principal-agente


  • Francisco Pérez García

    () (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas)

  • Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren

    () (Universitat de València)


This paper analyzes the problems in designing a tax sharing system when there are two governments levels with rights over the same taxes. Using a principal-agent model, the optimality of the different tax sharing systems is discussed. The presence of efficiency problems derived from the lack of cooperation between governments is proved, using Bernheim & Winstons (1986) common agency theorems. It is finally shown how a cooperative result can be institutionally induced by creating, for example, a Common Tax Agency in which all implicated governments participate. El trabajo analiza los problemas de diseño de un sistema de participación en la gestión tributaria cuando existen dos niveles de gobierno con derechos sobre los mismos tributos. Con la ayuda de un esquema principal-agente, se discute la optimalidad de los resultados de los distintos sistemas de participación tributaria. Haciendo uso de los teoremas sobre agencia común de Bernheim y Winston (1986) se prueba la existencia de problemas de eficiencia derivados de la falta de cooperación entre los gobiernos. Finalmente se muestra cómo el resultado cooperativo podría ser inducido mediante algún remedio institucional, como la creación de una Agencia Tributaria Común, participada por todos los gobiernos implicados.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Pérez García & Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren, 1992. "Corresponsabilización fiscal de dos niveles de gobierno: relaciones principal-agente," Working Papers. Serie EC 1992-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1992-08

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