Agenda independence in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences
This paper deals with the analysis of allocation problems with single peaked preferences, under the condition of agenda-independence (that is, when the allocation rule yields the same final outcome, no matter how the problem is subdivided into partial problems). Since the Uniform rule does not satisfy this property, two alternative allocation rules are proposed and axiomatically characterized: the Equal-Distance rule (introduced by Thomson in 1994) and the Medley rule (which is a combination of the Uniform and the Equal Distance).
|Date of creation:||Oct 1996|
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|Publication status:||Published by Ivie|
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