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UNDERSTANDING PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INSTATE GOVERNMENTS: A Diffusion Theory Approach

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Since the New Public Management is emphasized, the practices of the business sector have been introduced to the public sector without careful assessment. One of the examples is the adoption of pay-for-performance across state governments. Although theories of pay-for-performance may be compelling, scholars have found failures of payfor-performance in the public sector. This study applies a diffusion theory to understand why state governments have adopted pay-for-performance although its effectiveness was not confirmed. Findings show that state governments tend to adopt pay-for-performance as their neighboring states have previously adopted it, but the marginal probability of adoption decreases as more neighbors have adopted pay-for-performance.

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  • Sangyub Ryu & John Ronquillo & Cora Terry, 2013. "UNDERSTANDING PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INSTATE GOVERNMENTS: A Diffusion Theory Approach," Working Papers EMS_2013_17, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2013_17
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    File URL: http://www.iuj.ac.jp/workingpapers/index.cfm?File=EMS_2013_17.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    Keywords

    pay-for-performance; policy diffusion;

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