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„Zombierennen“ und „Patenonkel“ - Warum deutsche Fussballklubs in der Champions League den Kürzeren ziehen

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  • Egon Franck

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Obwohl die Bundesliga in dem potentiell attraktivsten europäischen Fussballmarkt operiert, ziehen ihre Klubs in der Champions League vor allem gegen die Konkurrenten aus der Premier League systematisch den Kürzeren. Weil Überinvestition gerade nicht durch eine Auflösung der betroffenen Klubs bestraft wird, trägt der Turnierwettbewerb im europäischen Fussball den Charakter eines „Zombierennens“. Klubverfassungen beeinflussen dabei ganz ent-scheidend die Möglichkeiten der Turnierteilnehmer, neue Finanzierungsquellen für den Rüs-tungswettlauf zu erschliessen. An einem prominenten Beispiel, den „Geldspritzen“ so genann-ter „Patenonkel“ wird der gegenwärtige Wettbewerbsnachteil der über Vereinsverfassungen kontrollierten Bundesliga-Mannschaften detailliert herausgearbeitet.

Suggested Citation

  • Egon Franck, 2010. "„Zombierennen“ und „Patenonkel“ - Warum deutsche Fussballklubs in der Champions League den Kürzeren ziehen," Working Papers 0124, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Egon Franck, 2010. "Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member’s Association Governance Structures in European Football," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 5(2), pages 108-127, May.
    2. Helmut M. Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2008. "Overinvestment In Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(3), pages 353-368, July.
    3. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Patrick, 2003. "Überinvestitionsprobleme in einer Sportliga," Working Papers 0020, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    4. George Akerlof, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617.
    5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 845-858, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Markus Lang & Martin Grossmann & Philipp Theiler, 2011. "The Sugar Daddy Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 557-577, December.
    2. Pamela Wicker & Christian Weingärtner & Christoph Breuer & Helmut Dietl, 2012. "The Effect of a Sports Institution’s Legal Structure on Sponsorship Income: The Case of Amateur Equestrian Sports in Germany," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 7(4), pages 340-357, November.
    3. Marc Rohde & Christoph Breuer, 2016. "Europe’s Elite Football: Financial Growth, Sporting Success, Transfer Investment, and Private Majority Investors," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 1-20, June.

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