On Reputational Rents as an Incentive Mechanism in Competitive Markets
This paper shows that more intense competition may improve, rather than hamper, the chances that a market for an experience good or service overcomes the problems caused by informational asymmetries. This, in spite of the fact that intensified competition diminishes the reputational rents that -allegedly- provide the incentives for the production of high quality. Our results show that instead, these incentives are created by price differentials not levels.
|Date of creation:||2009|
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- Douglas W. Diamond, 1998.
"Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
602, David K. Levine.
- Fuente,Angel de la, 2000. "Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585293, October.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
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