Axiomatic Characterisation of Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregators
A Federation Boolean Vote Aggregator allows a finite set of coalitions to unilaterally elect any candidate from a set containing exactly two candidates. There are several special types of Federation Boolean Vote Aggregators, all of which share a property: the candidates are assigned weights, and for a coalition to be decisive, it is necessary that the sum of the weights of its members exceed a pre-assigned quota. In this paper we address the following question: When is a Federation Boolean Vote aggregator a Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregator?
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||02 Feb 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 91 79 2630 7241|
Fax: 91 79 2630 6896
Web page: https://web.iima.ac.in/publications
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp01718. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.