On the Existence and Efficiency of a Voting Equilibrium for a Public Good Economy
The main purpose of this paper is to formalize the concept of a compromise function. Subsequently, given a compromise function, we define a voting equilibrium and prove the existence of such equilibrium. We further show in our analysis that under some assumptions a voting equilibrium is Pareto optimal. We also show that voting equilibrist is invariant under cost linearizing transformations of the original economy. Finally, we close our analysis by exhibiting an intimate relationship between voting equilibria and Nash equilibria in the case of private provision of public goods.
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