Distributive Justice with Externalities and Public Goods
We analyze in this paper the distribution of a fixed amount of perfectly devisable private goods among a fixed number of agents and with a certain portion of the private goods allocated for the creation of public goods. Each agent’s preferences exhibit a type of consumption externality made precise in the paper, and we focus our attention on the existence of efficient and egalitarian allocations of the goods.
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