Incentive Efficiency of Correlated Equilibria with State Dependent Payoffs
In this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games.
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