Household Negotiation and Labor Supply: Evidence from the BHPS
In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule representing the negotiation process inside the household, introducing a number of original distribution factors, such as political and religious involvement and parents’ occupational level. We do not find any significant impact of marriage market opportunities on the balance of power inside the couple. We emphasise that the sharing rule should be interpreted carefully when analysing intra-family inequality issues.
|Date of creation:||24 May 2002|
|Date of revision:||24 May 2002|
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